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Abstract 
As modern welfare states are reforming, relationships and processes of accountability in 
public sector systems are transforming. This transformation has consequences for the 
relationship between the public, political and administrative institutions as well as service 
production, and ultimately concerns democratic legitimacy. In this article we focus on the 
hospital systems in Norway and Denmark, and explore the changes in accountability 
relationships that have come about in conjunction with reforms over the last 10-15 years. 
Departing from the theoretical idea that accountability serves several different functions 
and the empirical observation that recent reforms in the two systems are diverging as 
much as converging, we find that health care reforms provide fruitful cases for studying 
changing accountability relationships. We argue that the Norwegian and Danish hospital 
sectors, in spite of reform variation, are both moving from a situation characterized by 
democratic-administrative accountability mechanisms towards an increased focus on 
performance-oriented accountability mechanisms that combine and intersect with more 
traditional notions of democratic and administrative accountability. Finally, and based on 
this finding, we explore the implications for further research on accountability changes 
and reform. 
 
Nye ansvarsregimer i styringen av sykehus:  
En sammenligning av Norge og Danmark 
Reformer i moderne velferdsstater fører til endringer i ansvarsrelasjoner og prosesser for 
utkreving av ansvar i offentlig sektor. Disse endringene har konsekvenser for forholdet 
mellom befolkningen og offentligheten, politiske og administrative institusjoner, og angår 
til syvende og sist systemets demokratiske legitimitet. I denne artikkelen setter vi fokus 
på sykehussystemene i Norge og Danmark, og utforsker endringer i ansvarsrelaterte 
prosesser og relasjoner i forbindelse med de store reformene som er innført de siste 10-15 
årene. Med utgangspunkt i en teoretisk tanke om at ansvarsrelasjoner fyller flere viktige 
funksjoner i disse to systemene og det empiriske faktum at reformene i de to landene er 
like divergerende som de er konvergerende, finner vi at reformer i helsetjenestene gir 
gode eksempler på endringer i ansvarsrelasjoner og ansvarsprosesser. Vi argumenterer for 
at de norske og danske sykehussektorene i dag legger mer vekt på et mer prestasjons- og 
målingsorientert system som kombineres med og griper inn i mer tradisjonelle former for 
demokratisk og administrativt ansvar, til tross for tydelig variasjon i de senere reformenes 
innhold og innretning i de to systemene. Til sist diskuteres konsekvensene av disse fun-
nene for videre forskning på endringer i ansvarsrelasjoner og reformer. 
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4 
Introduction 
The rhetoric of reform usually poses questions of accountability in 
terms of whether government employees are more accountable after 
the reform than they were before. While it is not impossible to dis-
cuss accountability in terms of more or less, doing so implies a uni-
dimensional, linear concept that does not reflect the complexity of 
public management. (…) A more useful approach, (…) recognizes 
the various dimensions of accountability and the complex context of 
public accountability. (Romzek, 2000: 22) 
 
Around the millennial turn, both Norway and Denmark implemented reforms 
justified with the need to make hospitals more accountable. In spite of several 
studies on health sector reform in the Nordic countries (see e.g. Magnussen et 
al., 2009), previous studies have not focused on changes in accountability rela-
tions. Accountability is a promising entry point for analyzing developments in 
modern welfare systems, as it illustrates dilemmas between control and autono-
my, political and administrative governance, professions and citizens (Thomas, 
2003). Healthcare is at the core of the public welfare states, and both Denmark 
and Norway belong to a group of public integrated health systems with a strong 
public role in stewardship, financing and delivery of services, emphasizing dem-
ocratic governance at both central and decentralized levels. These two cases thus 
provide important insights into developments in systems that have relied strong-
ly on democratic and administrative accountability.  
Both systems have undergone recent large-scale administrative reforms 
within healthcare, whereas other Nordic countries have been more reluctant to 
undertake such reforms (Magnussen et al., 2009). They have also followed inter-
national trends to emphasize output accountability combined with new forms of 
procedural accountability through standards and guidelines (Burau &Vrangbæk, 
2008). Performance- and output-oriented organization and management models 
have indeed become more important in the Nordic countries, but are often char-
acterized in terms of the specificities of national context (Johnsen & Vakkuri, 
2006). Comparing two reform oriented cases increases the likelihood of captur-
ing state of the art trends within this category of health systems.  
Accountability is a multi-faceted phenomenon (Dubnick & Fredericksson, 
2011) reflecting specific types of relationships between actors and levels within 
systems, where actors have obligations to account for their decisions and behav-
ior. Actors may have to explain and justify their behavior in forums of different 
kinds, and such account giving may actually have consequences (Bovens, 2007). 
However, such relationships play out in different, interrelated spheres of society 
and take various forms. We distinguish between democratic, administrative, 
management and clinical accountability forms, arguing that the configuration of 
accountability relationships in modern societies and the interaction between 
them is important for understanding contemporary societal developments. Intro-
ducing the concept of accountability regimes (Goodin, 2003; Tuohy, 2003; 
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Mattei, 2009) to describe the combination and relative weight of different forms 
of accountability over time, we analyze the impact of health system reforms on 
the accountability regimes in Denmark and Norway.  
Our principal research questions are: How have recent health system reforms 
in Denmark and Norway affected democratic, administrative, managerial and 
clinical accountability relations, and how can we characterize the emerging ac-
countability regimes for health care in the two countries?   
The following section presents the analytical background for the study in 
more detail, followed by a section on design and methods, and subsequently an 
analysis of the dynamic relationship between reforms and accountability rela-
tionships in the two hospital systems. We move on to present our findings, be-
fore closing with a discussion about implications of the findings in a theoretical 
and empirical light.   
 
Analytical approach: Understanding accountability 
Bovens’ (2007) definition of accountability1 is based on the distinction between 
an actor and a forum, and includes the precondition that some form of instru-
mental authority is involved: The actor may face consequences on the basis of 
being held accountable by the forum, and the forum has the necessary authority 
to both demand accounts and impose sanctions.  
At the core of accountability relations is a “speech act” associated with so-
cial rituals such as excuse making, face-saving or acts of rationalization and 
justification. Involved in each of these is the capacity of one party in any social 
relationship to offer an account of their actions to the other parties, based on 
social expectations of account giving (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2011). This 
occurs in a variety of ways, depending on the institutions, regulatory frameworks 
or even the subject matter in question (Kearns, 1996, Johnson et al., 2011), just 
as expectations of timing, the content of accounts and the types of potential sanc-
tions vary over time and across social spheres. Formal rules for accountability 
relationships represent conscious attempts to establish such expectations and 
obligations. Formal rules are constantly interpreted and applied in practice, how-
ever. Referring to Deborah Stone’s definition of policy instruments as “ongoing 
strategies for structuring relationships and coordinating behavior to achieve 
collective purposes” (Stone, 2002: 262), we argue that accountability forms can 
be viewed as strategies for forming legitimate expectations of when and how 
account giving should take place and for structuring relations between actors and 
forums. Following Bovens and Schillemans (2011), modern societies contain a 
multitude of such accountability forms, which analytically can be related to 
different social logic systems. We find distinguish between democratic, adminis-
trative, management and clinical/quality related accountability forms.  
By democratic accountability we underline the relationship between politi-
cal leadership and citizens; that politics and policies are displayed and performed 
in a variety of areas where citizens may act as a forum towards political leaders. 
One thing is the formal connection between assemblies and elections, another is 
more informal relationships and processes that exist and take place within a 
Haldor Byrkjeflot, Simon Neby and Karsten Vrangbæk 
 
 
 
 
6 
greater political context, e.g. civil interest groups, the media and politicians. By 
administrative accountability we emphasize the relationship between administra-
tion and political leadership, where the dimension of interest is accountability 
exercised within the “chain of command”, e.g. between ministries, directorates 
and audit agencies, and in turn between such agencies and the hospital entities. 
Administrative accountability has a strong focus on legality and due process. By 
management accountability we hint at the introduction of new types of relations 
based on contracting and performance management within hospital organizations 
and between hospitals and their principals. Clinical/service quality accountabil-
ity refers to accountability relationships that oriented towards operational quality 
performance and professional standards. The following table illustrates core 
dimensions in each of these accountability systems, although the reader should 
keep in mind that they interact, and that real life distinctions are more blurred 
than ideal types. 
Accountability also takes different directions:  Schillemans (2011) distin-
guishes between horizontal and vertical accountability relationships. Vertical 
accountability refers to situations where a superior demands an account from a 
subordinate. As with classical hierarchy, authority and distribution of roles are 
formalized or of a strong character. In horizontal accountability mechanisms, the 
situation is rather an absence of hierarchical relations. Instead there is an ac-
countability relationship to a third party, a peer, or a non-hierarchical forum. The 
relationship may or may not be formalized; there is no subordination of one actor 
towards the other, as in the relationship between a semi-autonomous audit agen-
cy and an administrative institution. Bovens (2007) includes the possibility of a 
diagonal arrangement where the forum is not hierarchically superior to the actor, 
but still has sanctioning powers and acts on behalf of another authority. Om-
budsmen or independent complaint boards could be examples of such accounta-
bility arrangements; they are not superior to the actors the hold accountable, but 
act on behalf of “the system” or “the public interest.” 
We introduce the term accountability regime to capture the combination of 
different accountability systems at any given point in time.  Reforms may shift 
the relative importance of different accountability logics explicitly through new 
formal rules, or implicitly by introducing new institutional structures and rela-
tionships. Based on our presentation of theoretical concepts we propose the fol-
lowing general expectations: 1) accountability relations have become more com-
plex and interlinked over time (Bovens & Schillemans, 2011), 2) management 
accountability has become more important within contemporary accountability 
due to NPM style reforms particularly in Norway, 3) clinical/quality accountabil-
ity has changed from being an internal professional matter to being a more gen-
eral, public and integrated part of management, administration and even demo-
cratic accountability relations, 4) vertical accountability forms are increasingly 
substituted by diagonal or horizontal forms due to NPM style decentralization 
reforms.  
 
 
Changing accountability regimes in hospital governance 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 T
ab
le
 1
: C
or
e 
ty
pe
s a
nd
 d
im
en
si
on
s o
f a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 
C
lin
ic
al
/q
ua
lit
y 
A
dm
in
is
tra
t-
io
n/
m
an
ag
em
en
t ↔
 c
lin
ic
al
 st
af
f a
nd
 
cl
in
ic
al
 su
bu
ni
ts
 
Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 p
ee
r r
ev
ie
w
 
B
en
ch
m
ar
ki
ng
 o
f c
lin
ic
al
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 C
lin
ic
al
 q
ua
lit
y 
an
d 
ou
tc
om
es
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tio
n 
↔
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
M
an
ag
em
en
t ↔
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
C
on
tra
ct
s a
nd
 ta
rg
et
s 
 B
en
ch
m
ar
ki
ng
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 “
bo
tto
m
 li
ne
” 
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
C
on
tra
ct
 ta
rg
et
s 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
ch
ai
n 
of
 
co
m
m
an
d:
 H
ig
he
r l
ev
el
 ↔
 lo
w
er
 
le
ve
l a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
st
af
f/u
ni
ts
 
 H
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l o
r d
ia
go
na
l 
sc
ru
tin
y 
an
d 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
D
ue
 p
ro
ce
ss
, l
eg
al
ity
 
A
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
ta
rg
et
s a
nd
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
V
ot
er
s ↔
 p
ar
lia
m
en
t 
Pa
rli
am
en
t ↔
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t ↔
 a
dm
in
is
tra
t-
io
n 
El
ec
tio
ns
 
Pa
rli
am
en
ta
ry
 sc
ru
tin
y,
 
qu
es
tio
ns
, v
ot
es
 o
f n
o-
co
nf
id
en
ce
 e
tc
 
B
ud
ge
ts
 a
nd
 b
ud
ge
t c
on
tro
l 
Po
lit
ic
al
 c
on
tro
l a
nd
 sy
st
em
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
 St
ru
ct
ur
al
 d
im
en
si
on
: 
W
ho
 is
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
, a
nd
 w
ha
t 
is
 th
e 
fo
ru
m
? 
fo
r?
 
Pr
oc
ed
ur
al
 d
im
en
si
on
:  
H
ow
 a
re
 a
ct
or
s h
el
d 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e?
  
 Fo
cu
s:
  
W
ha
t a
re
 a
ct
or
s h
el
d 
ac
co
un
ta
bl
e 
fo
r?
 
 
Haldor Byrkjeflot, Simon Neby and Karsten Vrangbæk 
 
 
 
 
8 
Design and methods 
The data for this study primarily comes from written sources (public documents, 
secondary literature, and media). We have not collected new data from inter-
views, surveys, etc, but draw on previously collected survey and interview data 
for background information. This approach was chosen for two reasons: Firstly, 
the number, size, scope and timing of the reforms and institutional changes in 
question necessitated an aggregated and relatively broad approach, as does the 
general complexity of themes associated with the development of accountability 
mechanisms in the Norwegian and Danish hospital systems. Secondly, we take a 
descriptive analytical approach; we are interested in understanding and exploring 
what the developments in accountability are about, rather than providing expla-
nations or analyzing effects.2  
Both countries’ hospital systems belong to a ‘family’ of systems often de-
scribed as decentralized NHS-type or Beveridge systems, although with a dis-
tinct Scandinavian twist (Blank & Bureau, 2004). The research undertaken thus 
draws on a design where differences in accountability relations developing over 
time between the two relatively similar systems are highlighted, in order to ex-
plore the effects of reforms on accountability relations. When it comes to re-
forms, this ‘most similar case’ design allows analytical control for contextual 
variation that a ‘most different case’ design does not.  
Analytically, the idea is to identify converging and diverging accountability 
patterns across reforms and across countries. The approach is based on theoreti-
cally defined parameters, and has two tiers. Firstly, defining contents of account-
ability relationships are used as intakes to find arrangements that are relevant. 
Secondly, we classify the functions that accountability mechanisms serve 
through predefined categories – democratic, administrative, management and 
clinical accountability functions.  
 
Accountability regimes in Norway and Denmark 
Both hospital systems existed within relatively stable structural frameworks from 
around 1970 and until the millennial turn. Hospital services were generally con-
nected to local communities and, in particular, to the regional democratic level. 
In terms of democratic accountability, both countries from the early 1970s sub-
scribed to a two-step electoral assembly system, with county councils directly 
involved with hospital governance, but where the national assemblies and gov-
ernments also had influence through policy and financial schemes. The county 
councils were accountable for hospital matters and subject to elections, just as 
the national assemblies.  
In Norway, the 1970 hospital act formally placed hospital responsibilities at 
the county level, and a local government reform in 1975 introduced elected ra-
ther than appointed county councils (Angell, 2012). Counties became the prima-
ry democratic actor in hospital governance as local and regional politics became 
more relevant, in spite of mandatory central approval of plans (Byrkjeflot & 
Neby, 2008). County level politics directly influenced the outcomes of health 
Changing accountability regimes in hospital governance 
 
 
9 
policies, increasingly leading to conflict-ridden blame-games around finances, 
hospital (re-)location and closures. 
The formal accountability relationships in Denmark, prior to the 2007 struc-
tural reform, closely resembled those in Norway. County councils were formal 
hospital owners and the national government formulated general policies, as-
semblies on both levels subject to elections. Thus, citizens could hold both coun-
ty and national politicians accountable for hospital-related matters. Relationships 
between parliament and government were defined by the principle that a gov-
ernment can stay in power as long as they do not have a majority against them. 
Minority governments may be sanctioned politically by the parliament; parlia-
ment may use i.e. formal questioning, interpellations and hearings for holding 
government to account.  
Both countries employ ministerial rule, whereby a minister is ultimately ac-
countable for decisions made within her sector, following the possibilities for 
intervention and instruction that the minister has.3 These two features of parlia-
mentarism created strong accountability links between parliament and govern-
ment (and single ministers) in both countries. Ministerial rule opens the possibil-
ity that even detailed matters can become political and, ultimately, democratic 
accountability issues.  
Administrative accountability has also been similarly organized in Norway 
and Denmark. Politicians serve as heads of the bureaucratic administrative sys-
tem, e.g. the Minister of Health holds subordinate organizations accountable for 
implementation of policies, regulation, budgets and standards of due process. In 
both countries, the organization of ministries and the division of labor between 
them is in principle decided upon at the government’s discretion. Norway has a 
longer history for a Ministry of Health, where the Danish solution until 1987 and 
in the periods 2002-2007 and 2010-2011 was a coupling between health and 
interior affairs in one ministry.  
Another difference was the organization of superior professional-
administrative authorities on the one hand, and audit agencies on the other. The 
Danish Board of Health answers for professional advice and development, but 
also has central tasks concerning audits and inspections. In Norway, these re-
sponsibilities were distributed between two institutions; the Norwegian Direc-
torate of Health had professional administrative responsibilities, whereas the 
Board of Health Supervision was the prime audit agency (Neby, 2008). Both the 
Danish Board of Health and the Norwegian Directorate of Health fell within a 
vertical administrative accountability relationship towards government, however.  
The governance of the hospital level from these institutions’ point of view rested 
with advice on policy interpretation, guidelines, legal considerations, as well as 
communication of professional standards. These are relevant for hospital opera-
tion and provide a background against which hospitals and managers could be 
held accountable, within the regional political chain of command and by the 
electorate in general through displays of performance measurements, or adminis-
trative and professional audit mechanisms.  
In terms of management accountability and clinical accountability, hospital 
managers were primarily held accountable by their political superiors, the coun-
Haldor Byrkjeflot, Simon Neby and Karsten Vrangbæk 
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ties, whereas internal departments and professionals formally were accountable 
to hospital managers. Both in Norwegian and Danish hospitals a dual manage-
ment structure, in which doctors and nurses managed their own professional 
hierarchies, had developed (Jespersen & Wrede, 2009). For healthcare profes-
sionals, horizontally oriented peer and best practice standards were carried by 
professional associations, but also coupled with formalized public accountability 
measures (licensing and authorization). Clinical accountability was thus both a 
matter of the professionals’ relationship to the hospital management and of audit 
or inspection by agencies, mainly coupled with malpractice and adherence to 
professional standards. 
Describing the Norwegian and Danish hospital systems in the thirty-odd 
years before 2000 in terms of an accountability regime, both countries were 
marked by a politico-administrative arrangement where democratic accountabil-
ity on the regional and national level was combined with administrative account-
ability. The main accountability directions were vertical, with the notable excep-
tion of a more diagonally oriented Norwegian health audit system and the role of 
the Danish National Board of Health in surveillance of regional hospitals and 
individual health professionals. There was a close proximity between healthcare 
politics at the regional level and hospital operation in both countries, representa-
tive of the two-tiered democratic accountability.  
 
Reforms and changes influencing accountability regimes 
Norway 
In Norway, an important change in democratic accountability came with the 
2002 hospital reform4. As a response to pressures for increasing efficiency, gov-
ernability, quality and cost reduction, the reform replaced county governance of 
hospitals with a system of state-owned regional trusts that in turn own local 
hospital enterprises.5 Both levels are managed by executive officers, and gov-
erned by boards that are accountable to the minister of health. The minister is 
accountable to parliament; democratic accountability is placed at the national 
level. Finances now come directly from the state through a combination of block 
grants, specific grants and activity based financing; before 2002, counties allo-
cated funds. The portion of activity based funding has varied since 2002, subject 
to budget negotiations in the Storting. Detailed financial questions have become 
issues of national democratic attention and activated several accountability 
measures. The number of formal questions about hospital matters raised in the 
Storting has increased markedly and been maintained at a high level since the 
introduction of the 2002 reform (Neby, 2008; Opedal & Rommetvedt, 2005). 
This escalating exercise of democratic accountability could also be interpreted as 
a consequence of the removal of the county level, however: Matters of local 
character are frequently debated in the Storting, indicating that politicians seek 
to remedy the lack of local and regional democratic accountability.  
The formal organizational structures of the regional health trust and local en-
terprises (led by boards) have implications for both administrative and man-
Changing accountability regimes in hospital governance 
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agement accountability. Originally, the composition of boards and appointment 
of managers aimed at a ‘professional approach’ in the sense that experience and 
competence from similar arrangements was to be weighted heavily. Politicians 
were never excluded from the boards (Hegrenes, 2008), but were in 2005 intro-
duced as mandatory regular board members (Haug et al., 2009). Listings of 
board members after 2005 include party affiliation (Byrkjeflot, Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2011).  
The 2002 reform was as a response to blame-games and conflicts crossing 
institutional and political boundaries between the county councils and the state 
(Byrkjeflot & Neby, 2008). Accountability still crosses institutional boundaries, 
however. By example, in the 2011 local elections, a municipality with a tradi-
tionally strong support for the labor party witnessed a massive drop from 26,5% 
to 8% in support for the labor party and a 5,9% to 43,9 % increase in support for 
the social liberal party. The election’s results are widely interpreted as a demo-
cratic reaction against a decision about closing the local hospital’s maternity 
ward6 – although local politicians had no influence over the decision. In effect, 
voters symbolically and practically sanctioned the labor party, which currently 
holds main positions in the national government (including the minister of 
health). 
These developments coincide with diagonal administrative accountability is 
becoming increasingly important (Neby, 2009). Administrative accountability 
processes take different forms; sometimes case-specific and retrospective in 
orientation, sometimes general and scheduled. Professional conduct is an im-
portant accountability theme: Critical cases regularly reach the media, raising 
questions of accountability touching upon professional standards, regulation, 
administrative responsibilities and politics. Such cases illustrate that bureaucrat-
ic, managerial or professional matters can become political; state ownership of 
hospitals has not reduced the importance of democratic accountability.  
There is also the possibility that different accountability relations may be 
combined. After the 2002 reform, the Auditor General is responsible for the 
central audit of Norwegian hospitals, a consequence of state ownership of the 
hospital trusts and enterprises (counties were subject to the audits of the regional 
state representative). The Auditor General’s reports are directly available to 
parliament. By default, the Auditor General is important for government, serving 
a democratic function based on its functional affiliation with parliament.  
In terms of the Board of Health Supervision, a new arrangement was intro-
duced in 2012: The central agency now holds superior audit responsibilities for 
health specific matters, but the actual inspections are performed by the regional 
state representative. The Board of Health Supervision no longer has regional 
representatives performing individual audits.  
The governance of Norwegian hospitals is based on a system with letters of 
instruction stating policy aims for the hospitals (Byrkjeflot & Guldbrandsøy, 
forthcoming). Hospital enterprises and regional trusts answer to the minister of 
health concerning the fulfillment of these aims, which in turn makes a compari-
son to contractual relationships relevant. Although the relative distance between 
government and hospitals is large, the coupling between national policy and 
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implementation in hospitals is more direct than it used to be. This allows politi-
zation of administrative or management issues at the hospital level.  
The Norwegian regional trusts and local enterprises were established as pub-
licly owned companies, and, in accordance with the NPM ideals, management 
became a central issue (Byrkjeflot, 2005). Dual management was replaced with a 
unitary management scheme, in combination with the board system of the re-
gional trusts and local enterprises. The idea was that management should be 
conceived as a professionalized responsibility, independent of the traditional 
medical managers (Jespersen & Wrede, 2009). This corporate-style structure 
differs from traditional approaches to public administration in welfare provision, 
as seen in areas such as immigration or social security. Although the health en-
terprises are not directly influenced through elections, they are open for political 
intervention. It seems apparent hard for politicians to distinguish between princi-
pal cases and matters of detail (Danielsen et al., 2004; Byrkjeflot & Grønlie, 
2005), indicating a connection between administrative and management ac-
countability relationships through the structural anatomy of the system on the 
one hand, and the demands for a more measurable management practice on the 
other. 
The introduction of activity based financing (ABF) schemes and the DRG-
system came in the period between 1997 and 2001. Coding of treatments directly 
intervenes with the daily work of healthcare professionals and managers, and 
cases where coding practices have been misused or faulty, influencing cash 
flows to hospitals, have occurred (Lægreid & Neby, 2012). In these cases, the 
boards and managers of the local enterprises are held accountable, e.g. by the 
Auditor General – in turn effectively creating a link between administrative 
accountability and democratic accountability at the national level. Large-scale 
schemes such as ABF and DRG systems influence accountability connections 
between clinical, managerial and administrative parts of the hospital system. 
 
Denmark 
The Danish structural reform of 2007 was a general public administration reform 
affecting all sectors of the welfare state, particularly along the lines of democrat-
ic accountability. The reform introduced a system with five regions (replacing 13 
counties) and 98 municipalities (replacing 275 smaller municipalities). Elected 
politicians head the new regions, which have taken over the role as hospital 
owners. Finances for hospital services come partly from the state, partly from the 
municipalities. Thus, democratic accountability is both tied to election of region-
al political representatives, and to local municipal and national level politics. The 
regions are financially dependent on two different democratically accountable 
levels, but retain responsibility for the operation of hospitals.7  
Municipalities and regions negotiate mandatory agreements that set opera-
tional and financial frames for their interaction. These agreements are approved 
by the Board of Health, which couples administrative accountability on the state 
level with democratic accountability on the local and regional level. The agree-
Changing accountability regimes in hospital governance 
 
 
13 
ments also could be taken to indicate that procedural and formal matters become 
more central to accountability in the Danish system.  
The Danish system is practically a three-way system where citizens may 
hold all three tiers accountable: Local, regional and national politicians all deal 
with health matters, and they are all forums for actors within the health care 
system. Importantly, whereas the 2002 reform in Norway was a hospital reform 
only, the 2007 structural reform is a reform of the entire local and regional gov-
ernance system as much as of hospitals. Matters of democratic accountability in 
Danish regions and municipalities thus extend beyond hospital matters. 
Vrangbæk (2011) argues that there is more to this picture, stressing the im-
portance of accountability connected to performance. In Denmark, a range of 
national quality criteria has been introduced and user evaluation surveys are 
produced regularly. Hospitals are evaluated on a regular basis. There is a system 
for accreditation and hospitals are benchmarked. Such benchmarks and standards 
have been met with criticism, but authorities have responded by promising to 
improve them in order to achieve the stated goals. Jespersen (2008) argues that 
whereas the Danish quality system is of a grander scale, it also relies on the 
medical profession to a greater extent than the Norwegian system.  
 Increasing focus on quality measurements, user satisfaction surveys, patient 
rights and waiting time guarantees serve to introduce standards to which differ-
ent actors within the hospital system may be held accountable. Managerial and 
clinical action relates to performance indicators relating to efficiency, budget 
discipline, quality, clinical guidelines and standards for best practice. This drive 
towards performance complicates the democratic and administrative accountabil-
ity dimensions in part by cutting across policy decisions.  
Three other developments are important when comparing the Danish and the 
Norwegian cases. Firstly, much like the Norwegian case, the National Account-
ing Office has gained more importance as an accountability forum for the re-
gional and municipal health services. This new role is a result of the change from 
regional to state financing of health care, and provides a stronger diagonal ac-
countability influence. Secondly, the National Board of Health gained stronger 
formal powers to oversee the regional and municipal health authorities as a con-
sequence of the 2007 structural reform. This means that the Board takes a more 
active role in developing standards and guidelines, and in establishing frame-
work structures for measuring and comparing performance at the regional and 
municipal levels.  
Lastly, the activity based financing system until recently played a lesser role 
in Denmark. Originally introduced as an information system in 1995, it was 
coupled with financial schemes in 2000 – for reimbursement of cross-county 
choice patients (Vrangbæk, 2004). From 2004, 20% of hospital reimbursements 
were activity based, following an agreement between the central and the local 
level. From 2007, when municipal and regional organization changed drastically, 
regions now redistribute 50% of the funding along an activity-based scheme. 
Moreover, as the central state and municipalities have shared financial responsi-
bilities for hospitals (80/20, respectively), 5% of government and 10% of munic-
ipal reimbursement is activity based, resting on the DRG system (Magnussen et 
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al., 2009). In addition, there is an activity based governmental pool, reimbursing 
regions for increases above normal activity. Hospital financing thus reflects both 
the accountability relationships in the system and the direct linkage between 
performance and incentive. There are three tiers: The central state, the regions 
and the municipalities. 
 
Discussion: Comparing accountability 
Initially, we asked two basic questions to guide our exploratory approach: How 
have recent hospital system reforms in Denmark and Norway affected democrat-
ic, administrative, managerial and clinical accountability relations, and how can 
we characterize the emerging accountability regimes for health care in the two 
countries?  
 
Similarities: Towards more complex and performance oriented accounta-
bility? 
Firstly, in terms of similarities there are some shared developments relating to 
increased use of managerial accountability.  Reliance on economic incentives, 
managerial accountability and more flexible administrative steering systems is 
greater where formal hierarchical accountability is replaced by procedural and 
output/outcome related accountability. Such solutions are visible e.g. in the 
Norwegian combination of semi-autonomous corporate-like structures with 
agencies auditing hospital performance: Patient choice creates mobility amongst 
patients, in turn creating a need for redistribution of funds. Patient choice also 
rests on the precondition that information regarding e.g. waiting times and quali-
ty of care is available to potential “choosers” – requiring monitoring of hospital 
performance. This monitoring connects to accountability, as low scores on im-
portant performance indicators typically will lead to increased attention on po-
tential shortcomings. This loops back to policymakers and becomes part of dem-
ocratic and administrative accountability processes. In Denmark too, ABF 
schemes, patient choice and transparent use of quality indicators are becoming 
more important, underlining the importance of performance-oriented accounta-
bility mechanisms. The more complex financial situation of Danish hospitals 
also shows how this connects to democratic accountability functions. Municipal 
co-financing is also being implemented in Norway from 2012, however, which 
will lead to further similarities between the systems.  
Secondly, the shift towards a stronger emphasis on procedural and out-
put/outcome-related accountability is a driver for change in accountability rela-
tionships. From filling predefined hierarchic roles, managers and professionals 
now to a larger extent adhere to standards that are imposed horizontally. Such 
adherence is also adopted on a more systemic level, for instance through institu-
tional arrangements for ensuring evidence based practices, quality and value for 
money (e.g. the Norwegian Knowledge Centre for the Health Services and the 
Danish Centre for Health Technology Assessment). Patient complaint boards 
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and ombudsmen are becoming increasingly important in both systems, providing 
diagonal accountability relationships.  
Thirdly, there is a layering of accountability principles for health care pro-
fessionals. Professional accountability is combined with other  accountability 
relations manifested through accreditation and quality control systems. Such 
regulation is intended to increase adherence to professional standards that are 
basically created by the professionals’ peers, but accreditation and quality con-
trols are typically located within the vertical administrative system. Professional 
conduct is a matter of both adherence to normative professional standards and 
administrative accountability.  
Fourthly, professionals are increasingly engaged in economic and output 
based accountability forms. Professionals devote more time to tasks related to 
coding, registration, record-keeping and so on, i.e. as budget responsibilities are 
delegated to clinics, departments and even bed posts, or as the difference in 
income for the hospital to a larger extent relies on registering diagnoses and 
treatments to be coded in the DRG system. Shifts in responsibility cause shifts in 
accountability, it seems: Where healthcare professionals are “forced” to perform 
new tasks, it is likely that accountability mechanisms follow the tasks that are 
actually performed.  
Fifthly, a gradual reconfiguration of the balance of power between the dif-
ferent levels in these multilevel governance systems seems to occur, implying 
more strict accountability relationships between state and decentralized authori-
ties. This corresponds to a central hypothesis following the NPM development, 
that creating more autonomous subordinate organizational units entails strength-
ened efforts of control. The increasing use of formal accountability mechanisms 
may well be such a response, not least as the themes and subject matters of ac-
countability become more articulated.  
Sixthly, this reconfiguration also implies new types of second order ac-
countability, where the state regulates the regulators or structures the horizontal 
relationship between different actors in the system, e.g. through establishing 
routines for negotiations and contracts or by establishing partnerships or project 
networks. This means that accountability arrangements will revolve indirectly on 
set aims for performance, by focusing on how networks and horizontal relation-
ships actually help produce desired end products.  
In sum, these six changes constitute the contours of an emerging new ac-
countability regime with more complex and layered accountability forms, and 
where political-administrative accountability changes and interacts in new ways 
with professional and quality based accountability. The distinction between 
democratic, administrative, management and clinical/service level accountability 
become more blurred, e.g. as performance accounted for at the level of service 
producers may in turn become a matter of democratic accountability for national 
politicians.8 
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Differences: Something old, something new 
In terms of differences between the changing accountability arrangements in the 
hospital systems, there are two general points to note. Firstly, the recent reforms 
(particularly the 2002 and 2007 reforms) may well signal that differences be-
tween the two systems are becoming more pronounced, but, secondly, it should 
be noted that some of the observed differences may have historical roots older 
than the years passed since 2002 and 2007.  
The most striking contrast is, firstly, the difference in the formal organiza-
tion of democratic accountability relationships in the two countries’ hospital 
systems. In Norway, democratic accountability is principally and formally con-
strained to the national level. In practice, the situation is more complex, as dem-
ocratic accountability tends to cross institutional and principal borders. The 
board structure in Norway represent a different form of accountability than that 
of Denmark, where the structural reform upheld the three-way tiers of democrat-
ic accountability linked to regional and local democracy. In spite of a drift to-
wards centralization and a redistribution of roles between the three levels in 
health matters, Danish citizens still elect official with influence over hospitals. It 
has been argued that the drift towards centralization in governance of hospitals 
has a longer historical foundation in Norway than in Denmark (Byrkjeflot and 
Neby, 2008).  
Secondly, there is a difference in the approach to hospital management. 
While management has received considerable attention in Denmark, unitary 
management schemes have not been introduced by law as in Norway. In Nor-
way, the implementation of unitary management has been a priority in hospital 
reorganization. This also means that the substantial contents of management 
accountability may vary between the Norwegian and Danish case: In Norway, 
single managers are perhaps more likely to be accountable for a wider range of 
issues than Danish managers are. It could also indicate that leading medical 
professionals in Denmark maintain a more traditional medical-professional role 
than is the case in Norway.  
Thirdly, there is a difference in how second-order accountability relation-
ships are organized and play out. In Denmark, the state holds both the regions 
and municipalities accountable for establishing and sustaining mutual coordina-
tion efforts, such as the negotiated agreements between regions and municipali-
ties. These agreements are mandatory, and the state oversees that they are in 
place and function as intended. The regions and municipalities are not only ac-
countable for their dispositions in the democratic sense – there is a more admin-
istrative form of accountability relationship to the state combined with the prin-
cipally horizontal accountability relationship between regions and municipali-
ties. In Norway, second-order accountability of this type relies on the hospital 
trusts. The local enterprises are accountable to the regional trusts, which again 
are held accountable to the minister of health. The differences from the Danish 
case rest with the absence of a democratic element at the local and regional lev-
els, and with the hierarchic relationship between regional trusts and local enter-
Changing accountability regimes in hospital governance 
 
 
17 
prises. Nevertheless, regional and local matters are often politically (Neby, 
2008).  
Summing up, it does seem that accountability relationships are becoming 
more complex, but also more important as tools of governance. The overlaps and 
links between different types of accountability on different levels within both 
hospital systems seem to have become more pronounced: This could be inter-
preted as a consequence of the NPM-style reforms undertaken in the last couple 
of decades with an increase in external, diagonal and horizontal accountability 
relationships. The 2002 hospital reform in Norway and the 2007 Danish struc-
tural reform contributed to this, not least as the reasoning underpinning these 
reforms focuses on performance: From being a matter for professionals, perfor-
mance now cuts across distinctions between democratic, administrative, man-
agement and clinical accountability relationships.  
We also find some evidence that clinical/quality accountability has changed 
from being an internal professional matter to being a more general, public and 
integrated part of management, administration and even democratic accountabil-
ity relations. Management/performance accountability has become more im-
portant, and diagonal and horizontal forms complement vertical accountability 
forms. 
 
Implications 
In terms of generalization, the accountability changes discussed above relate to a 
larger discussion on how the balance between super- and subordinates is orga-
nized, a discussion about the scope of governmental control on the one hand, and 
subordinate autonomy on the other (see e.g. Christensen & Lægreid, 2001). 
Thus, legitimacy becomes a concern: Accountability relationships are both de-
signed and implemented to contribute to higher levels of legitimacy, certainly 
true for democratic accountability. If subordinated entities become more auton-
omous, policymakers need to ensure some other form of control. Accountability 
relationships could ideally contribute to legitimacy as they can be seen as struc-
tural and functional insurance against malpractices, or as balancing the relation-
ship between those who govern and those who are governed. This could be true 
from either a politicians or a citizens’ perspective, where the performance of the 
hospital system is as important as its organization.  
The challenge is, however, that the opposite situation is equally likely: Ac-
countability relationships and the functions they serve can contribute to creating 
a state of distrust, where the rationale is that actions and actors must be checked 
and scrutinized: There are always incentives or possibilities for undesired behav-
ior. This raises questions about whom we are to trust or distrust: Doctors, politi-
cians, administrators, or economists? Trust or distrust towards public systems are 
in the end matters of democratic influence, and a question following this is 
whether highlighting issues of legitimacy has the potential to influence demo-
cratic governance in general and exercises of accountability in particular.  
Moreover, the increasing use of administrative accountability contributes to 
complexity in governance, as the functions and direction of the arrangements are 
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ambiguous. Accountability relationships cross different areas of the welfare 
state, and have potential for highlighting problems and challenges to a larger 
extent than successes and achievements. Thus, these arrangements may drive the 
development towards what is newsworthy, and not necessarily what is important. 
A good scandal sells more newspapers, and newspaper reports trigger questions 
about consequences for involved actors. Accountability arrangements and the 
attention they generate may have the capacity to change the attention of politi-
cians and bureaucrats away from what has previously been regarded as central 
issues in health policy. This means that arguments about accountability may be 
used as part of strategies to change the focus of health politics.  
Building on the previous point it seems accountability cannot be understood 
as a singular or simplistic phenomenon, but must be treated as a multidimension-
al feature of governance. In terms of management and service/clinical accounta-
bility, this is the case where medical, managerial, administrative and economic 
tasks meet and intersect, partly as consequences of reforms and policy change. 
As doctors become professional managers and are given economic tasks, the 
scope of the accountability relationships they take part in become broader. How 
are considerations related to accountability balanced with central values concern-
ing medicine, management and finance, and how do these elements contribute to 
the overall development of the system?  
All in all, there is a shift away from a democratic-administrative focus, to-
wards a focus on combinations of performance accountability and democratic 
accountability, where output dimensions play a stronger role combined with 
systems for holding health professionals and organizations accountable for ad-
hering to standards and guidelines. Whereas there are a few important differ-
ences between the Norwegian and Danish hospital systems, this shift is a com-
mon development. 
In the hybrid nature of Norwegian and Danish hospital governance, vertical, 
horizontal and diagonal arrangements are combined; multiple variants of ac-
countability have become a feature of these systems. This underlines the inter-
section between politics and administration, between complexity and more sin-
gular objectives in each arrangement. Important questions are whether the lines 
between politics and administration in terms of accountability are challenged, 
and whether such changes have potential consequences for governance. An ap-
proach to this discussion is to relate the findings about accountability changes to 
the broader literature about new governance forms (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2007; Peters, 2001; Fredericksson, 2005; Lynn et al., 2001). Accountability falls 
well within the definition of governance offered by Lynn et al. as “regimes, 
laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, pre-
scribe and enable the provision of publicly supported goals and services” 
(2001:7). Yet, as noted by Fredericksson (2005:293) this broad definition should 
perhaps be narrowed down to understand public governance as “sets of princi-
ples, norms, roles and decision making procedures around which actors (manag-
ers) converge in a given public policy arena”. This comes close to our under-
standing of accountability as strategies for forming legitimate expectations of 
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when and how account giving should take place and for structuring relations 
between actors and forums. In this sense, our study of accountability speaks to 
the core of the understanding of new governance forms, as it includes formal 
rules as well as the more informal expectations, norms and practices developing 
on the basis of such rules. Studying new accountability forms is thus a key topic 
for understanding new governance relations. This is particularly important since 
the emphasis on accountability seems to be at odds with another characteristic 
often associated with governance as “steering at a distance” (Kickert, 1997), or 
facilitating “self steering” (Kooiman, 2003). Accountability seems to have ele-
ments of more “hands-on control”, and the rising interest in accountability could 
be seen as an antidote to the loss of direct control introduced by decentralization 
and delegation.  
Lastly, there is a need for understanding and explaining the forces that drive 
this development in accountability relations, provided that the descriptions and 
classifications we have are good enough. Explanation on the one hand includes 
the introduction of theoretical perspectives that suggest causal relationships and 
principal approaches to understanding governance. On the other, explaining 
accountability developments most likely entail an inclusion of a broader set of 
empirical elements, in order to understand the processes and contexts that recent 
developments in accountability take place within. Analysis of consequences 
should include the administrative or transaction costs involved in running ac-
countability schemes, and the more difficult issues of whether the increased 
accountability focus actually contributes to greater satisfaction among the users, 
and whether it strengthens the legitimacy of public health systems.  
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Notes 
1 The word ‘accountability’ has no direct translation in Norwegian or Danish. The words ‘ansvar’ or 
‘ansvarlighet’ are often used, but are not precise enough for our purposes. Bovens (2007) maintains 
that ‘accountability’ is a word of Anglo-Norman origins, referring to the 11th century Domesday 
Books, which served as a count of what was in the king’s realm and thus was a foundation for royal 
governance. 
2 This article is written as part of a project funded by the Norwegian Research Council; «Reforming 
the Welfare State: Accountability, Democracy and Management», headed by Professor Per Lægreid. 
3 In Sweden, such instruction is unlawful, and the government as a collective assumes responsibility 
(and accountability) for the government apparatus. The Swedish model thus has a more strict ap-
proach to delegation of responsibilities. 
4 Ot.prp. nr. 66 (2000-2001) Om lov om helseforetak m.m., Lov av  15. Juni 2001 nr. 93. Lov om 
helseforetak m.m. 
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5 We apply the term “trust” for the regional level and “enterprise” for the local level. The term “trust” 
refers to an entity that assumes responsibility for certain activities on behalf of its owners, but that 
does not carry out the actual operational tasks itself. The “enterprises”, however, have such opera-
tional responsibilities. 
6 Source: TV2 Nyhetene 12.09.2011. URL: 
http://www.tv2.no/nyheter/innenriks/politikk/valg2011/439-prosent-til-venstre-i-eid-3582922.html 
7 Lov nr. 537 af 24-06-2005 om regioner og om nedlæggelse af amtskommunerne, Hovedstadens 
Udviklingsråd og Hovedstadens Sygehusfælleskab.  
8 The authors are aware of a potential connection to the wider debate on different forms of govern-
ance, e.g. the discussion of governance modes (see e.g. Pierre and Peters 2000). We see accountabil-
ity as reflecting particular types of relationships and processes within a larger context of governance, 
understood as “All means by which the behavioral regularities that constitute social institutions are 
maintained and reinforced” (Crouch 2004:105). 
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